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Prof. Kalechofsky's paper reminds one of a vivid
impressionistic painting: it is a passionate (a
complimentary term) indictment of vivisection and
male domination and control and hints at strong
historically and culturally evolved links between the
two. Now, I am not an expert on the Victorian period,
and insofar as the paper is historical and factual, there
is little that I can or want to say about it, other than
to attempt to clear up what I believe to be some
misconceptions in another historical period on which
she touches, the Ancient and Hellenistic one.

Laura Westra
The University of Toledo

For instance, the assertion about "the Greek
distrust of emotion, particularly sexual emotion, the
view of orgasm as a form of madness..." needs some
consideration. If it is madness, it is "divine" in itself,
indubitably inspired by a god, Eros. One needs simply
to recall the Symposiwn, or Plotinus' Enneads 1.6, 6.9
and parts of 6.8,· to discover beauty and physical love
depicted as a necessary first step to the ''higher'' life of
the philosopher, the thinker, and the mystic, all of
which are not purely intellectual, in the strictly
"rational" sense modem philosophy might suggest, but
intuitive as well. Both Plato and Plotinus viewed the
love for embodied beauty as the natural beginning of
love for higher harmonies. In Plato's case, Eros was
the central figure of the dialogue, and "sexual love"
had little or nothing to do with women anyway:
sexual emotion, whether trusted or not, was primarily
a step on the road to knowledge and virtue, for men
by men. In Plotinus' case, the gender of the
"embodied beauty" remains ambiguous, but the notion
that matter is evil has disappeared. Enneads 2.9
("Against the Gnostics") repeats and argues staunchly
for one main point: if you treat or consider anything
within the material, actual world as evil, you offend its
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times, even in the sexual act, the complete
investigator." She isolates, correctly I believe, the two
main aspects of violence, coercion and 'ultimate
disrespect for living creatures, whether human females
or "lower" animals, as 1) the detached, impassive,
objective, so-called "scientific" stance, and 2) the
intrusion of the machine. The latter she also attests to
in the last sentence of the paper: "we expect"
machines "to tell us" what changes in male sexual
response to sadistic pornography can possibly mean.

Source. All things in the world are - to some extent
- good, because they flow from There (from the
One, through the other Hypostases). Moreover, all
matter is fonned: for Plotinus all that is is united in
kinship and infused with intelligence. Even rocks,
trees and streams, in fact, all nature contemplates
(Em. 3.8).
Kalechofsky is on more solid ground, however,
when she points to the Stoics (and, I might add, the
Cynics as well) as extolling self-sufficiency, non
involvement, and self-control as an ideal; compassion
was a Stoic sin, and Plotinus himself speaks that way
at times, suggesting that it perverts justice, which
would eventually prevail, in this life or another, as
part of the design of the universe.

The first point she makes clearly shows that
"detached" and "objective," both prized characteristics
of the revered scientific enterprise, are neither
detached nor objective; that model and that stance
simply manifest a clear subjective bias, one that
emphasizes that lack of empathy is a ''higher'' male
prerogative and that it is like "mere women" to be
"emotional" or sensitive. This macho model of so
called scientific impartiality, of course, did not
disappear with Victorian times; he is alive and well
today, his stiff upper lip undiminished.

On the other hand, even that emphasis on control
is in fact limited to self-control; "mastery" is to be had
over one's own self, not others; and neither humans
nor animals are really involved, except in the sense
that we might speculate that sympathy might be
equally out of place for either. Dombrowski, for
instance, quotes Porphyry (Plotinus' prize pupil)
extensively on the connection between humans and
animals, based on cosmic "sympathy." He defends the
differences between animals and plants: the latter
have no capacity to feel or be afraid and thus cannot
be injured, unlike animals who share these capacities
with us.! Plotinus, of course, was known to have been,
like Porphyry, a vegetarian.

But it is in her second point, that is, in her distaste
for power and the intrusion of controlling
technologies, that one can perceive a theoretical
grounding for an animal ethic. After speaking of the
"profound and terrifying transformations" animals had
to suffer as a result of the Industrial Revolution,
Callicott, for instance, says:
The very presence of animals, so emblematic of
delicate, complex organic tissue, surrounded by
machines, connected to machines, penetrated by
machines in research laboratories or crowded
together in space-age production facilities is
surely the more real and visceral source of our
outrage at vivisection and factory farming than
the contemplation of the quantity of pain these
unfortunate beings experience.2

Nor do I agree with the connotations of her
assessment of Aristotle's position. His view of nature
as a "predatory hierarchy" is simply a factual
observation of the interdependence between plants,
animals and so on (and I will say more about this
later).
The strongest point of Kalechofsky's paper, I
believe, and the statements I particularly want to
focus on as central to our enterprise here, come when,
after a description of the "technological aids" (such as
rape-racks) and the conceptual framework of
"overpowering" women in Victorian pornography, she
says:

Indeed, a whole host of philosophers have decried
the dehumanizing effect of technology, from
Heidegger's indictment of "enframing" rather than
espousing the behaviour appropriate to a "shepherd of
Being," to the "schizophrenia" engendering effect of
corporate ideology (MacIntyre), to the "game playing"
in business, where "good" only means a means to an
uncritically accepted end (Ladd), finally leading to
the Arrogance of Humanism (Ehrenfeld), which
accepts intrusion and interference in nature as our
natural right. But Callicott puts his finger on the
clearest and perhaps the only way one can attempt to
espouse and ground consistently both an
environmental (land) ethic and an animal ethic - no

De Sade believed that nature was vicious and
exulted in crime, and that he received his
obsession from nature. Nature knows no such
models as De Sade describes, but the modem
world, in its admiration for objective cognition,

does.
She goes on to emphasize that de Sade was "at all

187

Between !he Species

principle: All disrespectful interference is morally
wrong, and technological intrusion is particularly
vicious, as even further removed from a "natural"
model, or at least a model compatible with the
unfolding of natural processes. But limited,
controlled, and respectful use of other entities within
an ecosystem by human or others is not always
wrong. Examples might be humans eating a normally
caught fish or naturally grown chicken (but not
"farmed" vea!), cutting trees (but strip-cutting only)
for non-trivial needs, a tiger eating an antelope, and
an antelope grazing.

mean feat, as I discovered. I will not rehash the
arguments Callicott presents to explain the surprising
confl ict between the two. It appears to be easier to
move from the "top" down - so to speak - that is,
to move from the so-called paradigm case of human
beings by analyzing which aspects of the paradigm are
relevant to moral consideration in order to show
"comparable worth" in animals, than to take the
opposite route.

It is exceedingly hard instead to go from an
environmental cposition based on a land ethic to a
position which supports animal ethics in an individual
sense. The holistic ecologist starts from the opposite
direction, that is from the value of and the respect for
all nature. Humans and animals are reduced to the
position of parts of a very valuable whole in which
every tree, stream and grassy knoll is viewed as
intrinsically as well as instrumentally valuable. I have
defended intrinsic value elsewhere. 3 Instrumental
value arises from whatever ensures the continued
health, integrity, diversity and beauty within the
ecosystem of which it is a part. How then to argue for
the individual rather than species-based rights of one
of the components of the community, without thereby
abandoning the general argument for respect,
however it may be based?
It is important to note that even Taylor, who also
makes "respect" his central notion, only deals with
animals in the wild,4 and I suspect that neither his
ethic nor any other that I am acquainted with, is fully
adequate to deal with the problem of domestic
animals (although Rolston suggests a helpful approach
of which there is more below). I suggest an addi tion to
both Taylor's and Callicott's argument which I cannot
fully work out now but which seems to me to
represent a possible way for a workable ethic. It seems
inconsistent to work out an ethic of "respect,"
whether explicitly (Taylor) or implicitly (Callicott)
for life and nature, and extend this respect only to its
component parts while denying it to its processes and
the ways in which it functions. Once again we need to
allow an "is" to circumscribe at least the parameters of
our "ought." Callicott is correct, for instance, in
pointing out that the "liberation" of domestic animals
would be disastrous from the standpoint of ecosystems
as a whole and of the animals themselves. s

A similar attitude can be found in what one Cree
student of mine described as the "Pan-Indian"
approach to the environment, and Chief Wawia of
the Red Rock Band (North of Superior Ojibways)
termed "always using only what I need on the trail,
and leaving the rest for the man coming after me."
Other Native descriptions of their life and rituals
speak of asking its forgiveness before cutting down a
ceremonial tree or completing the hunt and killing
the bison. It might be true that it is "a dog eat dog"
world, or at least a world of predators and hunted out
there, but that is simply the way it is, not anyone's
perverted pleasure or power-crazed game. A wolf's
intraspecific respect for its mate, its young and its
leaders does not carry on outside the species to hares
or plants, but it also does not lead him to inflict pain

A theory following from a) respect, b) a simple
but thorough awareness of the "is" involved, that is,
of the circumstances and processes existing and
possible in nature, and c) a recognition of the
difference between ''basic'' and "peripheral" needs, as
VanDeVeer has it,6 might suggest the following
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Humans are claiming no superiority or privilege
exotic to nature. Analogous to predation,. human
consumption of animals is to be judged by the
principles of environmental ethics, not those of
interhuman ethics...What is in nature may not
always imply ought (and may seldom do so in
interhuman ethics), but ought in environmental
ethics seldom negates what is in wild nature.l°

beyond what is necessary to his own most basic needs.
The wolf will kill for meat, for his survival and that of
his young, but not for dessert or sport or "science." We
could show our respect for natural life in all its forms
by not looking down on the wolf's ways as "inferior"
or such that we should do ''better,'' at least not in
regard to the basic needs we share with him. This is
not a call to regress to the cave, but it re-echoes
Callicott's call to a healthy, fit and fitting life-style.

Thus it is not in indicting naturalism (in Aristotle
or other Hellenistic or Medieval thinkers) that we
find the best road to a sounder ethical basis, nor are
they the worse culprits as initiators of later
disregard of animals, women and human and non
human emotion in general. I see the main source of
the problem in the worship of science, a much later
phenomenon.

The sort of interference that even contemplates
the possibility of changing the distinctive stripes of a
zebra,? even in the interest of the better survival of the
species, appears intuitively to be disrespectful, and as
plain wrong as attempting to change the tendencies or
character of the human race, even for its own "good"
or better survival. Russow's "zebra" example does not
show primarily, as she believes, that we can only care
morally about individuals rather than species. It
manifests instead an ominous belief in the "divine
right" of humans to interfere in processes they only
dimly understand, as Ehrenfeld for instance has amply
proven. 8

It seems to me that Kalechofsky's point about
machines is well-taken, and in that case it is the
impersonality, the means/ends relations and the cult
of efficiency and technology/science that are the
worse culprits by far. But I am almost as repelled by
attempts to make the natural world "nice" at the
expense of their own true being. Of the two attitudes,
that is, the callously exploitive one and the well
meaning paternalistic one, clearly the former is by far
the more objectionable, but both are intrinsically and
unforgivably disrespectful. Even if I could, I don't
think I would find it morally satisfying to train or
breed tigers to eat coleslaw or humans not to eat any
animal protein at all. For the latter I would still see
vegetarianism as far preferable even on ecological
grounds, but I would also accept Callicott's three
''best'' approaches as sound,11 especially for those who,
like myself, might be allergic to beans and nuts,
provided that the minimum is used and that it not be
grown through "agribusiness" or through disrespectful
practices. If some may find "respect" a strange word to
use in regard to an entity toward whom a violent
action might be aimed, one need simply recall the
martial art practice of offering deep bows to
opponents before fighting, a practice I do not view as
self-contradictory.

Even Kalechofsky seems prone to this malady to
some extent. Aristotle was perfectly correct in seeing
and describing a "predatory" aspect to nature.
Hierarchical scales exist in ecosystems in general,
interspecies and intraspecies as well (such as pecking
orders, the status of individual wolves within a group
and so on). He was obviously wrong in extending his
observations to a normative assessment of the social
world, basing himself primarily on his culturally
bound understanding of women, for instance, as
"weak." One might say it is both correct and natural
to protect the weak and the incompetent, such as
the newborn, but it is incorrect to extend this
"protection" with its concomitant implicit
depreciation to females of all species, since lionesses
hunt and even bird ladies take turns out of the nest
catching worms.
I am not alone in defending the role of the "is" in
all ethical thought concerned with the natural world.
Since I have completed these comments, I have found
a similar position is held in the most recent work of
Holmes Rolston, lIP As in previous papers, he
emphaSiZes the role of the "is" in regard to the "ought"
in environmental ethics. Speaking of our duties to
higher animals, for instance, he asserts that we owe
them no absolute duty to spare them all "innocent
suffering," whereas we must spare them "pointless
suffering." In extending what is in nature to the
"natural" (as contrasted with the "cultural") in human
beings, Rolston maintains that,

I started my response to Prof. Kalechofsky by
discussing some points of disagreement with her
assessment of the Ancient and Hellenistic sources of
the attitudes she so vividly outlines and vigorously
attacks. On the other hand, I also stated my
agreement with what I take to be her main points
about the moral unac~eptability of scientism and
technologism, particularly when allied with sexist and
speciesist leanings. I further sketched an argument to
ground a position on animals which, while not in
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conflict with some of her points, might also be
compatible with the biocentric, ecological ethic I
espouse and hope to work out more fully at a later
date. This allowed me to support a view of Aristotle
that is in conflict with that presented in her paper.

3Westra, L., See "Let it Be: Heidegger and the Future,"
EtwironmentalEchics, Winter, 1985, Vol. 7; "Shrader-Frechette, Risk
Assessment and the Is-Ought Fallacy," Agrarian, Clemson
University, 1987; "The Philosophical Understanding of Human
Beings For an Ecologically Sound Ethic," for the 18th World
Congress in Brighton, England, August 21-27,1988.

Has my response added anything to her views about
the similarity between Victorian positions about
women and animals and their possible common origin
in male domination and the apparent sadistic quest
for absolute power that she suggests? Probably not. But
this appears to be primarily a question for psychology
or sociology to answer in a historical context; that is a
question from which a mere philosopher should
abstain.
0
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